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In this paper we use MIMOSIS, a Microsimulation model for Social Security and personal income taxes 
in Belgium (Decoster et al., 2007), to simulate the redistributive impact of potential reforms in the 
family allowances system. The aim of these hypothetical reforms is to adapt the amount of social family 
allowances and to extend their coverage to other groups at-risk of poverty. Up to now, only single-
parent families and specific categories of social security beneficiaries (i.e. unemployed, disabled and 
pensioners) were concerned. The simulated reforms extend these social family allowances supplements 
to other children, mainly those living in working poor households, on a means tested base. As is often 
the case, the concepts used to evaluate the simulated reforms are different from the ones used to 
implement them. Nonetheless all suggested measures result in a considerable increase of the number of 
children below the poverty line that receive an additional supplement. Some of the suggested reforms 
even reach almost all children below the poverty line and much less those above, which illustrates that 
the measures are targeted well on those who have a high risk of being poor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) adopted by the European Union in its Lisbon 2000 meeting 
fixed a series of social inclusion targets, among which the reduction of poverty. These targets were 
associated with specific indicators defined at the EU Laeken 2001 meeting, known today as the EU 
National Action Plan Inclusion Indicators (NAP-Incl framework). 
In this paper we are interested in one of these indicators, the at risk of poverty rate measured among 
children living in Belgium, and on the potential impact of hypothetical reforms of social family 
allowances on this indicator. For this purpose we use MIMOSIS, a Microsimulation model for Social 
Security and personal income taxes in Belgium (Decoster et al., 2007). 
The aim of these hypothetical reforms is to adapt the amount of social family allowances and to extend 
their coverage to other groups at-risk of poverty in the population. Up to now, only children of single 
parent families and specific categories of social security beneficiaries (i.e. unemployed, disabled and 
pensioners), were eligible for family allowances supplements, on the basis of earning tests. The aim of 
the potential reforms analysed here is to extend the eligibility conditions, mainly to working poor and to 
other jobless families. 
Several simulations are made using alternative reform scenarios. All scenarios consist in the extension 
of family allowances supplements, either to all categories of the population, or to workers only, on the 
basis of earning tests applied to total family income or to labour income exclusively. These scenarios 
introduce changes in supplements, for all eligible children, either increasing the allowances for the first 
rank child, or proposing uniform amounts for all ranks. They also simulate changes in the single parent 
and two-parent families’ earnings mean test thresholds. 
The obtained results illustrate, among other things, the difficulty to identify accurately families and 
children at-risk of poverty. For instance, in the case of Belgium, analyzed here, the eligibility for social 
family supplements is based upon a narrow definition of the household composition, which is called the 
nuclear family. It is generally composed of the mother, the father and the children.2  
It does not take into account other individuals that could live with that narrow family, as a grand-parent 
for example. But when studying poverty rates, we use a broader concept which is the sociological 
household. It includes all the individuals living in the household, i.e. a grand-parent, a child considered 
as non dependent, a daughter-in-law, etc. As a consequence, income of the nuclear family on which the 
granting or not of the supplements is based can be quite different from income in the sociological 
household. If the income of the first concept is sufficiently lower than income in the second one, the 
system may give a supplement to a family which is indeed not poor when all incomes of the household 
are taken into account. The reverse can also be true: a family can be excluded from a supplement 
because its income is too high, but when considering the sociological household, the family actually has 
to share this income with other low-income members of the household (a grand-parent with a very low 
survival pension for instance).  
This paper is divided into several sections. In Section 2, we present the design of the family allowances 
scheme. Section 3 is devoted to a description of the MIMOSIS model and of the dataset we use. Section 
4 describes the simulated reforms of the family allowances system and their main characteristics. In 
Section 5 we present our results. The first part of this section is devoted to a comparison of the at-risk of 
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poverty rates obtained for the case of Belgium using EU-SILC and MIMOSIS. The second part shows 
the main results of the simulated scenarios with particular attention to different types of families, 
including single parent families, as well as labour market status of parents. Section 6 contains the 
conclusions of this study. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE BELGIAN FAMILY ALLOWANCES SYSTEM 
2.1. BASIC AMOUNTS 
Here we describe the family allowance system as applied on January 1st 2010. In this system a basic 
amount is granted to all eligible children for whom the claimant is entitled to child benefits. In principle 
the claimant is entitled on the basis of current or past contributions as either a) a wage earner, b) a civil 
servant or c) as a self employed. 
In general, the granting of the basic amount to eligible children is thus not means tested. Nonetheless, an 
exception is possible here. If a beneficiary with children who are eligible in principle, would not be 
entitled to benefits on the basis of his past or present contributions he can apply for a guaranteed benefit. 
This benefit is means tested and thus only granted under certain conditions. 
Children remain eligible until the age of 18 without further conditions (21 for handicapped children). 
They can continue to be eligible until the age of 25 under certain conditions (mainly because they 
continue to study, instead of working). The basic amount granted to eligible children differs according 
to the rank of the child but is more or less constant throughout the different regimes. The exception to 
this rule is that children of rank 1 of self employed get a slightly lower benefit. Orphans receive a higher 
amount than non orphans, as long as the surviving parent remains single. 
In Table 1, we give the monthly basic amounts, applied within the four different “schemes” on January 
1st 2010 according to the rank of the child. 
Table 1:  Monthly amount of child allowances in different schemes on January 1st 20103  
 Rank Wage earner Civil servant Self employed Guaranteed benefit 
1 1st rank 83,40 83,40 78,00/ 83,40 (*) 83,40 
2 2nd rank 154,33 154,33 154,33 154,33 
3 3rd rank 230,42 230,42 230,42 230,42 
(*)  78,00 € for the children who do not receive supplements for disabled, self-employed or for disabled/handicapped children. 
Note: Orphans, independently of their rank, 320,40 €. 
2.2. SUPPLEMENTS 
On top of these basic amounts, certain supplements may be granted. 
A first supplement is granted depending only on the age of the child (i.e. it is not means tested). These 
age supplements differ according to the rank, differ between those that are eligible for social 
supplements and those who are not (see below for a discussion on the social supplements) and are not 
constant throughout the different regimes. In the self employed scheme youngest and single children are 
treated differently than within the other regimes. 
                                                
3
  See the ONAFTS website for amounts for wage earners and for the guaranteed scheme: 
http://www.rkw.be/Fr/Documentation/Amount/amountAllowance_0000.php 
 See the INASTI website for amounts for self-employed: http://www.rsvz.be/fr/tools/numbers/familyallowance_child.htm  
 See the ONSSAPL website for amounts for civil servants: http://www.rszppo.fgov.be/fr/citoyens/allocationsfamiliales/montants.htm   
  4. 
In Table 2 we give the “general” monthly amounts of the age supplement, applied within the four 
different “schemes” on January 1st 2010 according to the rank of the child. 
Table 2: Monthly amount of age supplement in different schemes on January 1st 2010 (in €)4  
 Rank Wage earner and Civil servant Self employed (*) Guaranteed benefit 
  ‘Ordinary’ 
allowances 
Social allowances ‘Ordinary’ 
allowances (*) 




1 1st rank 6 to 11= 14,53 
12 to 17= 22,12 
18 on= 25,50 
6 to 11= 28,98 
12 to 17= 44,27 
2 2nd rank 
3 3rd rank 
6 to 11= 28,98 
12 to 17= 44,27 
18 on= 56,29 
6 to 11= 28,98 
12 to 17= 44,27 
18 on= 56,29 
18 on: 
1st child= 48,86 
2nd child a.o.=56,29 
6 to 11= 28,98 
12 to 17= 44,27 
18 on: 
1st child= 48,86 
2nd child a.o.=56,29 
6 to 11= 28,98 
12 to 17= 44,27 
18 on= 56,29 
Note: Age supplements for children aged 6 years old or more. 
(*) In the scheme for self-employed, youngest and single children with only ordinary allowances don't receive age 
supplements. 
 
A second supplement (which we call the social supplement) is granted to people with certain types of 
replacement income. People who are unemployed, on sick leave for more than 6 months, disabled or 
retired can be granted the social supplement. For those who meet this status condition, the gross family 
income is compared with an income ceiling that varies according to the family status: 
− if the recipient lives together with a husband/wife/partner (and children) the labour income and 
benefits of both partners should not exceed a gross monthly amount of 2.131,19 EUR 
− if one lives alone (with children) the labour income and benefits should not exceed a gross monthly 
amount of 2.060,91 EUR. 
In principle, all types of income are taken into account to calculate gross income. This includes among 
other things: 
− benefits from unemployment, for health insurance, for industrial accidents, for occupational 
diseases, for the handicapped and subsistence level benefits;  
− pensions;  
− wages;  
− income as a self-employed;  
− Replacement incomes for the handicapped 
The following types of income are excluded from the gross income concept: 
− child benefits;  
− alimony;  
− compensations for the help of certain third parties;  
− integration compensations for the handicapped  
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The recipient and the possible husband/wife/partner are considered to be a factual family when they: 
− live together at the same address;  
− are not related to each other up to the third degree (so parents, children, brothers, sisters, 
grandparents, uncles, aunts are excluded here);  
− and arrange the household together and both contribute to it financially or otherwise. 
In Table 3 we give the monthly amounts of social supplements as applied on January 1st 2010 according 
to the rank of the child. 
Table 3: Monthly amount of social supplements on January 1st 2010 (in €)   
 Rank Long term unemployed/pensioners Disabled people 
1 1 42,46 91,35 
2 2 26,32 26,32 
3 3 with couple 4,62 4,62 
4 3 with single 
parent 21,22 21,22 
The recipients who are not entitled to a social supplement because they do no meet a status condition 
(i.e. are not unemployed etc.), may be entitled to a single parent supplement. They are granted this 
benefit if they are single (i.e. they do not form a factual family) and their gross income is below the 
single parent ceiling used for the social supplement (i.e. 2.060,91 EUR). 
In Table 4 we give the monthly amounts of single parent supplements as applied on January 1st 2010 
according to the rank of the child. 
Table 4: Monthly amount of single parent supplements on January 1st 2010 (in €)   
 Rank  
 1 42,46 
 2 26,32 
 3 21,22 
Apart from a supplementary benefit the recipients who are entitled to a social supplement, the single 
parent supplement or the supplement for handicapped children also receive a higher (in most cases a 
double) age supplement for children of rank 1. In these occasions the age supplement of children of 
rank 1 is equal to the more elevated age supplement of children of a higher rank. The lower (halve) age 
supplements are applied to those children of rank 1 who are not granted these supplements. 
The social supplement and the single parent supplement can not be combined by the same child. 
However, children of rank 3 who receive the social supplement and live with a single parent, receive a 
higher social supplement than those who live with a couple. In fact, the supplement for all children of 
rank 3 who live with single parents and meet the eligibility conditions for one of the supplements is the 
same for all, whether they receive a social supplement or not. 
3. DESCRIPTION OF MIMOSIS AND OF THE DATA 
MIMOSIS is a microsimulation model for the Belgian social security and personal income tax system, 
running on a dataset with administrative data.5 The underlying sample of the model contains individual 
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identification variables that mostly date from the last quarter of 2001. Nominal variables, like wages or 
allocations are either simulated or inflated to the price level of the “day” of analysis, i.e. the first of 
January 2010 in this study. 
To construct the underlying sample a two step procedure has been followed. First, a random sample of 
100.000 individuals was drawn from the set of all individuals who, according to the National Register, 
are known to have had their main place of residence in Belgium on January 1, 2002. Individuals in this 
random sample could be either living in private or collective households (e.g., retirement homes or 
prisons). In a second step, the sample was extended to all household members of those individuals 
drawn in the first step and living in private households. The final sample comprises a set of 305.019 
individuals. Sample weights have been constructed to inflate the sample to a level of about 10,2 million 
individuals or 4,3 million households. These weights correct the over-representation of larger 
households caused by the sampling method.6 
For the sample, a data set with microdata from various administrative sources was constructed. Apart 
from some household characteristics taken from the National Register (age, sex, relationship between 
household members, region, and population density in the residence area), the data set consists of 
variables taken from the “Datawarehouse labor market and social protection” maintained by the 
CrossRoads Bank for Social Security. The data set we employ contains: (i) labor market income and a 
number of labour market characteristics for wage earners in either the private or public sector; (ii) some 
labour market characteristics and incomes of the self-employed; and (iii) information on various social 
benefits, such as unemployment benefits, sickness, and disability benefits and pensions. 
With this sample, seven different policy areas have been modelled: a) social security contributions, b) 
unemployment benefits, c) sickness and disability benefits, d) family benefits, e) welfare adaptations of 
pensions, f) existence minima and g) personal income taxes. For the current version of the model, these 
policy domains have been parameterised for the tax benefit years 2001 until 2010.7 
The use of a microsimulation model of this kind is indispensable for the current analysis for two 
reasons. First, such a model allows keeping track of the - often hidden – interactions between different 
income components and eligibility rules. Secondly, the underlying database with micro information on a 
representative sample of households or individuals allows to complement the standard aggregate results 
(e.g. for the budget) with a rich and detailed distributional analysis. One of the main deficiencies of the 
current version of the model is that it is probably too generous in attributing social minima, this due to 
the fact that we lack a proper take up function of these kind of benefits. We do not have information on 
those who take up social benefits and those who don’t. Since these benefits are means tested and we do 
dispose of most income components used within the test we can replicate the test. This implies that all 
people who are considered to be eligible according to our data, are granted the benefit. However, it is 
well known that for these types of benefits not all people eligible for it in principle, also take up the 
benefit in reality.8 
In the current exercise simulations will be carried out in a static way (i.e. the underlying population is 
kept constant) and apart from the changes in family allowance no other income sources change. Hence, 
for example household members do not adapt their labour supply and their labour income will remain 
constant between the baseline and the reform scenarios. 
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4. DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATED REFORMS 
We simulated 24 different reform scenarios. All these scenarios were set up to screen for those having 
low income but not receiving either a social supplement or a single parent supplement yet. Table 5 
summarizes the different scenarios (a more detailed presentation is given in Appendix 1 of this 
document). 
In the first 12 scenarios (i.e. labelled scenario Sim1 to Sim12 later on) we kept the means test thresholds 
applied to gross income constant as compared to the baseline scenario (i.e. 2.131,19 EUR for factual 
couples or 2.060,91 EUR for singles). 
For the next 12 scenarios (labelled Sim13 to Sim24 later on) the means test thresholds applied to gross 
income were slightly increased as compared to the baseline scenario (i.e. 2.362,04 EUR for factual 
couples or 2.077,38 EUR for singles). 
Table 5: Description of the reforms. Simulation numbers 
Simulation description Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Labour income yes - below threshold 
Household income below threshold below threshold - 
Thresholds unchanged 
(single parent = 2.060,91; couple = 2.131,19) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim4 Sim5 Sim6 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim7 Sim8 Sim9 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim10 Sim11 Sim12 
Thresholds modified 
(single parent = 2.077,38; couple = 2.362,04) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim13 Sim14 Sim15 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim16 Sim17 Sim18 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim19 Sim20 Sim21 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim22 Sim23 Sim24 
(*)  Including all categories of beneficiaries of social family allowances supplements.  
Within each set of 12 scenarios we have 4 groups of each time 3 scenarios (i.e. scenario Sim1 to Sim3, 
Sim4 to Sim6 and so on) in which we apply the same supplement under different income conditions. 
In a first scenario of each subset we test, for those not receiving a social supplement yet, whether the 
overall gross income is below the given threshold and whether they have labour income (this covers 
both wage earning income as income from a self employed activity). Since this part of the scenario only 
applies to those who did not pass one of the other, existing tests yet, this scenario is targeted at working 
couples. We refer to this type of simulations as simulations of Type 1. 
In a second scenario of each subset we test, for those not receiving either a social supplement or a single 
parent supplement yet, whether the overall gross income is below the given threshold. Hence, as 
compared to the previous scenario we drop the condition that there should be labour income. Therefore 
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this part of the scenario is targeted at couples with low gross income (independent of their income 
sources). We refer to this type of simulations as simulations of Type 2. 
In a third scenario of each subset we first test, for those not receiving either a social supplement or a 
single parent supplement yet, whether a) there is gross labour income and b) whether this gross labour 
income is below the given threshold. Hence this scenario is targeted at couples that fail previous tests, 
have low labour income but have other income sources that would bring them above the threshold in 
simulations of Type 1. We refer to this type of simulations as simulations of Type 3. 
The amounts of the additional supplements are inspired by the amounts in the existing supplement 
regimes. They are either a copy of it or a weighted average of the existing amounts. We guarantee that 
the supplements, according to the rank, are everywhere the same in the social supplement, single parent 
or the additional supplement regime that we simulate here. This explains why in some scenarios there is 
a lowering of the existing supplement and thus that there are losers because of the reform. This happens 
in scenario Sim7 to Sim12 and Sim19 to Sim24.9 
5. RESULTS 
There are several ways to look at the obtained results. In this note we focus on one type of poverty 
analysis. In the data set underlying the model, we have information on the household composition, i.e. 
we know which individuals within the administrative sample form a sociological household. In our case 
this means they are registered in a National Register as living at the same address. We also know the age 
of individuals and we observe various income components covering labour income and replacement 
income and personal income taxes paid on these components. All this information allows us to define 
the equivalised disposable income concept that is used throughout for computation of the at-risk of 
poverty rate, defined as 60% of the median of equivalised disposable household income.10 The 
equivalized income is computed using the equivalence scale defined as follows: 1,0 for the head of the 
household; 0,5 for the other adult (14 years old or more) and 0,3 for children (aged less than 14). The 
poverty threshold computed in this way, based on the whole population income distribution, is equal to 
816,9 € for a single adult household,1062,0 € for a lone parent household with one child, 1715,5 for a 
family composed of a couple with two children, and so on.   
Although we can apply the definition of the equivalised disposable income concept on the available 
data, this does not mean that we have all income components that might be considered to be relevant for 
a welfare concept. We lack among other things real estate income, income from movable property and 
information to identify benefits of certain disabled people. Neglecting this information most likely will 
lead to an overestimation of the at-risk of poverty rate, assuming that the neglected information does not 
influence the income ranking too much and keeps people below the poverty line while they are above in 
reality. Moreover, we neglect a child allowance supplement that is granted to children with a handicap. 
In 2009 about 2% of all eligible children were receiving such a supplement. Since the granted amounts 
are considerable it might be that a number of these children are, within our analysis, situated below the 
poverty line, while they would be above if the supplement for handicap were included. As explained 
above we also can not distinguish those who take up social benefits from those who don’t with the 
administrative data we currently have at our disposal. On the one hand, including the social benefits, 
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computed by replication of the means tests leads to an underestimation of the overall at-risk of poverty 
rate (mainly due non take up of social allowances). On the other hand, excluding these benefits from the 
computations leads to an overestimation of this overall poverty rate. Since the results excluding the 
social benefits are most in line with those of external sources11, we continue to report these results. 
With the available data we can reproduce some of the tables included in the Child Poverty report 
published by the European Commission in 2008.12 The results published by the Commission are mainly 
based on surveys conducted by the different member states. In essence the EU_SILC and the Labour 
Force Survey. We reproduced two basic tables here: 
− At risk of poverty rates according to household composition only 
− At risk of poverty rates according to household composition and work intensity 
In the tables according to household composition we distinguish the following household types: a) lone 
parents, b) couples with one child, couples with 2 children, couples with 3 or more children and 
complex households. 
Children are defined here as household members who are below the age of 18 and who are not head of 
the household. National Register information allows us to identify married couples or de facto partners 
who are living in the household.13 With the single/couple definition and the definition of children we can 
identify all household types listed in the tables of Child Poverty report explicitly except the complex 
one. The latter is defined as the residual category. 
For the singles and couples we also observe the number of hours worked per week. Those for which the 
official registered hours are 0, are considered to be jobless, individuals working more than 0 hours but 
19 hours or less are considered to be working part time. Individuals working 38 hours or more or 
working as self employed, are considered to be working full time. 
In the following subsections, we first discuss the comparison of our baseline results with those reported 
for Belgium in the EU-survey report. Although the results in the EU-survey report and our data are for 
different years, a comparison of both sources seems permitted, assuming that the at-risk of poverty rates 
for the studied subclasses remains rather stable over time. 
Secondly, we analyse the impact of the simulated reforms presented in Section 4, compared to the 
baseline situation. Namely, we focus on the effects of the reforms on the new targeted population and 
we also take into account all possible consequences it might have for those who already receive either a 
social supplement or a single parent supplement. Complete and detailed results for this section are 
presented in Appendices 2 and 3. Tables in Appendix 2 take into account changes in social family 
allowances for new beneficiaries exclusively, while tables in Appendix 3 take into account changes for 
all the beneficiaries. 
5.1. BASELINE RESULTS COMPARED WITH EXTERNAL SOURCE 
For 2005 the Commission reports an at-risk of poverty rate for the overall population for Belgium of 
15% and for children (i.e. household members below the age of 18) of 18%.14 We find, using 
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 See the report: “Child poverty and child well-being in the EU”, Report of the Indicator’s Sub-Group of the Social Protection 
Committee, SPC meeting on 13 December 2007. 
12
  See the report: “Child poverty and child well-being in the EU”, Report of the Indicator’s Sub-Group of the Social Protection 
Committee, SPC meeting on 13 December 2007. 
13
  Note that for this analysis we use a definition of a “child” (less than 18 years old) which differs from that used by family allowances 
administrations in Belgium  that includes also individuals aged 18 to 25 years old. Furthermore, this definition also differs from that 
used for poverty measurement purposes (less than 14 years old for a “child” and 15 and more for an “adult”). 
14
  See the report: “Child poverty and child well-being in the EU”, Report of the Indicator’s Sub-Group of the Social Protection 
Committee, SPC meeting on 13 December 2007, volume I, tables A1 and A2. 
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administrative sources an at-risk of poverty rate of 15.2% for the whole population and for children also 
15.2. 
One hypothesis for underestimating the at-risk of poverty rate of children as compared to the external 
source could be that the income sources, not included in our income concept, but included for the 
computations of the 2008 Commission report are relatively low for households with many children and 
high for households with few children. We thus find that the difference between the overall population 
at-risk of poverty rate and that of children is less pronounced then what one would expect on the basis 
of the survey computations. The results are summarized in Table 6. 
The at-risk of poverty rate of children is, almost for all subdivisions studied in this note, below the one 
reported on the basis of survey results, but the deviations differ among subgroups. However, the 
ordering in terms of the at-risk of poverty rates within subgroups seems more or less respected (i.e. the 
group with the highest risk in the external source, also has the highest risk in our source and so on or if 
the ordering is reversed this is for comparable at-risk of poverty rates). 
Table 6: Population at-risk of poverty (in %). EU_SILC vs. Baseline results15 
  EU_SILC Baseline 
1 Whole population 15,0 15,2 
2 Children 18,0 15,2 
3 Households   
4     Lone parent 37,0 30,8 
5     Couple + 1 child 8,0 10,5 
6     Couple + 2 children 10,0 9,5 
7     Couple + 3 children and more 21,0 16,5 
8     Complex, with children 21,0 10,6 
The differences between the obtained at-risk of poverty rate and the one presented in the external source 
seems striking for complex households.16 As a percentage of the external value, this at-risk of poverty 
rate deviates for about 50% from the external value while for the other subgroups the deviations are 
more modest. We therefore will not focus on the results obtained for complex households, which are a 
residual category, when discussing the simulation results.17 
We can also note large differences when looking at the subdivision by household type and work 
intensity in Table 7. In particular, the underestimations of the at-risk of poverty rates for couples with 
children and one full time worker only, is striking (9,5% against 26,0%). Indeed, the results in our 
analysis are underestimated compared with the external sources. Differentiation over the couples 
according to the number of children learns that this underestimation is mainly due to the 
underestimation of the at-risk of poverty rate of children within couples with 3 children or more and 
only one full time worker. Since the deviation between the overall at-risk of poverty rate of this 
subgroup with the external source is much less pronounced, this indicates that we probably fail to 
replicate the definition of one full time job in the source used for the Child Poverty report but also that 
the subgroup of one full time worker in the group with 3 or more children is not the dominant subgroup.  
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the EU”, Report of the Indicator’s Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee, SPC meeting on 13 December 2007.) 
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  Complex households are defined here as the residual class of households. 
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  Of all children that had to be classified only 1,3% was classified in these complex households, so we will neglect here a rather 
unimportant group. 
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Table 7: Children at-risk of poverty (in %) for different categories of households. EU_SILC vs. Baseline results18 
 Household members work status Couple 
  
Lone parent 
All 1-2 children 3 and + children 
  SILC Baseline SILC Baseline SILC Baseline SILC Baseline 
1 Jobless 65,0 48,3 85,0 75,0 75,0 73,9 85,0 76,1 
2 Part-time 33,0 28,5 41,0 36,5 43,0 35,0 41,0 38,9 
3 1 Full-time 11,0 4,8 26,0 9,5 16,0 10,2 26,0 8,3 
4 Full + Part-time - - 2,0 0,5 2,0 0,4 2,0 0,7 
5 2 Full-time - - 2,0 0,6 1,0 0,6 2,0 0,8 
6 All 30,7 30,8 14,0 12,0 9,0 9,9 14,0 16,5 
5.2. SIMULATED SCENARIOS COMPARED WITH BASELINE VALUES 
In this section we focus on the simulated impact of the reforms paying particular attention to the poverty 
rate among children. We first analyse the complete impact of the suggested reforms, taking into account 
all changes in the simulated benefits. 
Analysis of impact taking into account all simulated changes in benefits 
Table 8 reports the percentage of children beneficiaries for each of the 24 alternative simulations. As 
expected, reforms targeting all households with income below the threshold (Type 2) benefit a higher 
number of children, followed by reforms targeting only households with labour income below the 
threshold (Type 3). For instance, simulations Sim1, Sim2 and Sim3 concern respectively 6,5 %, 10,5 % 
and 9,5 % of all children (more than 2 million). And their number increases to 8,8 % (Sim13), 12,8 % 
(Sim 14) and 12,1 % (Sim15), respectively, when the mean test thresholds increase. 
Several simulations, Sim7 to Sim12 and Sim19 to Sim24, correspond to reforms addressing changes in 
the amount of social family supplements for all categories of beneficiaries. As these reforms are also 
applied to beneficiaries of social family allowances supplements in the baseline situation, the percentage 
of beneficiaries increases considerably (up to 26,9 % under simulation Sim20). Nevertheless, as a 
consequence of some of these reforms part of the beneficiaries of social family allowances in the 
baseline case are net losers after the reform: 1,7 % of 1st rank (disabled parent) children under 
simulation Sim7 to Sim9 and Sim19 to Sim21 and 5,1 % (unemployed, pensioners and lone parent 
households) under simulations Sim10 to Sim12 and Sim22 to Sim24.  
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  EU_SILC refers here to the Child Poverty report, published by the Commission (see the report: “Child poverty and child well-being in 
the EU”, Report of the Indicator’s Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee, SPC meeting on 13 December 2007.) 
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Table 8: Reforms simulations. Percentage of children gainers and losers 
Simulation description Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Labour income yes - below threshold 
Household income below threshold below threshold - 
Thresholds unchanged 
(single parent = 2.060,91; couple = 2.131,19) 
 Simul. Gainers Losers Simul. Gainers Losers Simul. Gainers Losers 
Supplements          
  Unmodified Sim1 6,5 0,0 Sim2 10,5 0,0 Sim3 9,5 0,0 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim4 6,5 0,0 Sim5 10,5 0,0 Sim6 9,5 0,0 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim7 20,7 1,7 Sim8 24,6 1,7 Sim9 23,6 1,7 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim10 17,5 5,1 Sim11 21,4 5,1 Sim12 20,4 5,1 
Thresholds modified 
(single parent = 2.077,38; couple = 2.362,04) 
Supplements          
  Unmodified Sim13 8,8 0,0 Sim14 12,8 0,0 Sim15 12,1 0,0 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim16 8,8 0,0 Sim17 12,8 0,0 Sim18 12,1 0,0 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim19 22,9 1,7 Sim20 26,9 1,7 Sim21 26,2 1,7 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim22 19,7 5,1 Sim23 23,6 5,1 Sim24 23,0 5,1 
(*)  Including all categories of beneficiaries of social family allowances supplements. See Table A3.7 in Appendix 3 for 
details.  
Table 9 reports the poverty rates among children after reform. Compared with the baseline situation all 
the simulations indicate a rather small effect, varying from 0,5 % point (Sim1, Sim3, Sim13 and Sim15) 
to 1,2% point (Sim23). Among all the reforms analyzed here, those that produce the more significant 
results correspond to Type 2, targeting all households independently of their source of income, mainly 
working poor, and to reforms designed to uniform social family allowances supplements for all children, 
independently of their rank position (Sim10 to Sim12 and Sim22 to Sim24).   
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Table 9: Reforms simulations, children at-risk of poverty (in %):Baseline: 15,2 % 
Simulation description Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Labour income yes - below threshold 
Household income below threshold below threshold - 
Thresholds unchanged 
(single parent = 2.060,91; couple = 2.131,19) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim1 14,7 Sim2 14,6 Sim3 14,7 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim4 14,5 Sim5 14,3 Sim6 14,5 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim7 14,4 Sim8 14,4 Sim9 14,4 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim10 14,2 Sim11 14,1 Sim12 14,2 
Thresholds modified 
(single parent = 2.077,38; couple = 2.362,04) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim13 14,7 Sim14 14,6 Sim15 14,7 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim16 14,4 Sim17 14,3 Sim18 14,4 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim19 14,4 Sim20 14,3 Sim21 14,4 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim22 14,2 Sim23 14,0 Sim24 14,2 
(*)  Including all categories of beneficiaries of social family allowances supplements. See Appendix 3 for detailed results.  
Whether the observed changes in the at risk of poverty rate for children are small or great remains a 
subjective judgement in the end. We consider them to be rather modest in this case. This implies that the 
suggested reforms attain only a limited amount of people who are at the edge of passing the poverty line 
with the additional benefits, while they would remain below this line without the benefits. This does not 
imply that the suggested reforms only affect this limited number of children, as was already illustrated in 
the discussion of Table 8 above. This conclusion should also not be interpreted as a judgement on the 
possible importance at the individual level of the extra amounts granted by the reform. Changes in the at 
risk of poverty rate tell us a) something about the impact of measures at the aggregate level and b) most 
importantly only something about changes at a very particular place in the welfare distribution. 
Even if it where the sole objective of the suggested reforms to focus only on those people who are at the 
edge of passing the poverty line, it should not surprise that only a limited amount of them is affected. 
The reason for this is that the national institutional rules used to target the population in need differ from 
that advocated by international institutions, and applied in this section, to identify children at-risk of 
poverty. 
In the case of Belgium, for instance, the family income taken into account for means testing is based on 
a narrow definition of the household and of its income resources, as well as it takes into account the 
family composition in a simple way: single parent vs. couple income thresholds. On the contrary, the 
equivalised income concept used to compute poverty rates takes into account the size of the household, 
with a distinction between adults and children (less than 14 years old), and an income threshold 
corresponding to 60% of median equivalised income in the whole population. 
That the differences between the baseline and the reform poverty rates are considered to be modest here 
should also not hide that these differences most likely will be statistically significant when applying the 
appropriate statistical inference measures. Using Kakwani’s (1990) measure for the standard error of the 
headcount at risk of poverty rate here as a proxy, learns that with an at risk of poverty rate of 15% and 
70.000 observations, differences of more than 0,26 percentage points between the baseline and the 
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reform will be outside the 95% confidence interval (i.e. having a value of the t-statistic of more than 
1,96). 
In order to analyse the potential improvement that the simulated reforms would imply for the screening 
of children who are at-risk of poverty, we compare the situation under the baseline case and after 
reforms for this particular population. The results are reported in Table 10. 
In the actual situation, and taking into account all kind of social family allowances (social supplements, 
guaranteed and orphan allowances, …), 53,3 % among poor children benefit from them. This percentage 
increases to a rate more than 70,0 % for Type 1 and Type 3 reforms, and close to 97 % for Type 2 
reforms.  
From this point of view the main effect of the reform corresponds to the extension of social family 
allowances coverage to new categories of the population. Mainly to jobless and working poor 
households, as will be shown later.  
We also computed the percentage of children above the poverty threshold receiving social family 
allowances after the reform (the results are not reported in Table 10 but in Table A4.1 in Appendix 4). 
The number of cases increases from 9,2% in the Baseline situation to 13,6% in simulation Sim1 and 
close to 20% under simulations Sim15, Sim18, Sim21 and Sim24. In other words, when children below 
the poverty line are targeted imperfectly, children above the poverty threshold benefit from the reform as 
well. 
The impact of increasing the income thresholds hardly has an impact on this measure (compare the 
results for thresholds unchanged with thresholds modified in Table 10). 
Table 10: Percentage of children at-risk of poverty receiving social family supplements: Baseline: 53,3 % 
Simulation description Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Labour income yes - below threshold 
Household income below threshold Below threshold - 
Thresholds unchanged 
(single parent = 2.060,91; couple = 2.131,19) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim1 73,0 Sim2 96,6 Sim3 73,0 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim4 72,6 Sim5 96,5 Sim6 72,6 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim7 72,8 Sim8 96,6 Sim9 73,0 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim10 72,8 Sim11 96,6 Sim12 72,8 
Thresholds modified 
(single parent = 2.077,38; couple = 2.362,04) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim13 73,5 Sim14 97,3 Sim15 73,5 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim16 73,1 Sim17 97,2 Sim18 73,1 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim19 73,5 Sim20 97,3 Sim21 73,5 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim22 73,3 Sim23 97,2 Sim24 73,3 
  
(*)  Including all categories of beneficiaries of social family allowances supplements. See Table A4.1 in Appendix 4 for 
detailed results.  
The considerable impact of the different reforms, that can be derived from the results presented in 
Table 10, does not contradict the observations made on the basis of Table 9. We see for instance in 
Table 10 that under Type 2 reforms near all children in poor household benefit from social family 
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allowances, while only one over two and two over four benefit from the Baseline and in Type1 and 
Type3 simulations, respectively. However when we compare the rates of poverty before and after reform 
reported in Table 9, we observe slight differences. 
This implies that the additional supplements only allow a limited amount of poor households to pass the 
poverty line due to the additional supplement (see Table 9) but at the same time that all suggested 
reforms reach a very considerable amount of children below the poverty threshold (see Table 10). Since 
the number of children above the poverty line benefit much less from the suggested reforms, one could 
say that the suggested measures are targeted well on those who have a high risk of being poor. 
To investigate how much the population below the poverty line moved, on average, into the direction of 
the poverty line, we computed poverty gaps. The poverty gap results are reported in Table 11.19 The 
results reported in Table 11 show a slight difference, 0,1 to 0,2 percentage point, variation in the poverty 
gap before and after the reforms. 
Table 11: Poverty gap among children at-risk of poverty (in %). Baseline: 3,2 % 
Simulation description Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Labour income yes - below threshold 
Household income below threshold below threshold - 
Thresholds unchanged 
(single parent = 2.060,91; couple = 2.131,19) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim1 3,2 Sim2 3,2 Sim3 3,1 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim4 3,1 Sim5 3,0 Sim6 3,0 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim7 3,1 Sim8 3,0 Sim9 3,0 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim10 3,1 Sim11 3,0 Sim12 3,0 
Thresholds modified 
(single parent = 2.077,38; couple = 2.362,04) 
Supplements    
  Unmodified Sim13 3,2 Sim14 3,1 Sim15 3,1 
  1st rank = 91,35 € Sim16 3,1 Sim17 3,0 Sim18 3,0 
  1st rank = 53,15 € (*) Sim19 3,1 Sim20 3,0 Sim21 3,0 
  All rank = 38,87 € (*) Sim22 3,1 Sim23 3,0 Sim24 3,0 
Finally, we are also interested in the impact of reforms on different categories of households on the 
basis of their composition, lone parent vs. couple and number of children, and the work status of 
parents. The rate of at-risk of poverty among children in these categories are reported in Table 12 on the 
one hand for the baseline and, on the other hand, for the reforms corresponding to simulations Sim1 
(Type 1, unchanged threshold and unmodified allowances amounts) and Sim23 (Type 2, threshold 
modified and uniform family allowances for all rank children and all beneficiaries). In fact, simulations 
Sim1 and Sim23 correspond to the two extreme reforms analyzed here, Sim1 is the less ambitious and 
Sim23 the most ambitious, respectively. 
The results reported in Table 12 can be summarized as follows: 
- As expected, simulation Sim1 has no effect on poverty rates among children in lone parent households 
and a slight effect among children living in jobless parent households. Remember that Sim1, like other 
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 The poverty gap indicates the average percentage gap between individuals’ equivalized income and the poverty threshold for the whole 
population, in this case for children, at-risk of poverty. 
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Type 1 reforms, is designed mainly to transfer social family allowance supplements to working poor 
couples. 
-  On the contrary, under simulation Sim23 jobless and lone parent households benefit from the reform, 
mainly jobless couples with 3 children and more (the poverty rate declines from 76,1 % to 68,7 %). In 
the case of simulation Sim23 the reform is designed to reach all categories of the population in poverty 
simultaneously increasing the mean test thresholds and introducing uniform family allowances for all 
children ranks.  
- But without doubt, the main effect of the reforms (Sim1 and Sim23) is among children living in 
working poor families composed of a couple with children. When parents, one or both, work in a part-
time schedule, the poverty rate in the Baseline situation is as high as 36,5 %. After reforms it is expected 
to diminish to 33,5 % (Sim1) or 33,0 % (Sim23). 
- Furthermore, as illustrated before in Section 5.1 (Table 7), close to one over ten children (9,5 %) living 
in families where only one adult has a full-time work are poor. The effect of reforms on poverty among 
them is proportionally the highest one. From 9,5 % to 8,1 % under simulation Sim1 and to 7,9 % under 
simulation Sim23. 
Table 12: Children at-risk of poverty (in %) for different categories of households 
In appendix 2 we also report a number of statistics for the new targeted population only. To compute the 
results, reported there, only the newly created benefit has been taken into account and the side effect of 
adapting the age supplement has been neglected. We call this the direct impact of the reforms. A number 
of things can be learnt from analysing these statistics and comparing them with the overall impact 
measures discussed so far and reported in appendix 3. A detailed analysis of these results is presented in 
a frame hereafter. 
Couple 
Household Lone parent 
All 1-2 children 3 and + children 
Baseline vs. simulation Sim1 
Status Baseline Sim1 Baseline Sim1 Baseline Sim1 Baseline Sim1 
Jobless 48,3 48,3 75,0 74,9 73,9 73,9 76,1 76,0 
Part-time 28,5 28,5 36,5 33,5 35,0 32,4 38,9 35,2 
1 Full-time 4,8 4,8 9,5 8,1 10,2 8,8 8,3 7,1 
Full + Part-
time - - 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,7 0,7 
2 Full-time - - 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,8 0,7 
All 30,8 30,8 12,0 11,5 9,9 9,3 16,5 15,9 
Baseline vs. simulation Sim23 
Status Baseline Sim23 Baseline Sim23 Baseline Sim23 Baseline Sim23 
Jobless 48,3 45,7 75,0 73,2 73,9 73,6 76,1 68,7 
Part-time 28,5 27,7 36,5 33,0 35,0 32,2 38,9 32,7 
1 Full-time 4,8 4,7 9,5 7,9 10,2 8,6 8,3 6,5 
Full + Part-
time - - 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,7 0,7 
2 Full-time - - 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,8 0,7 
All 30,8 29,3 12,0 11,4 9,9 9,2 16,5 14,8 
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Direct impact on the overall and children at risk of poverty rates for new categories affected by the 
reform (Annexe 2, Table A2.1) 
Of the 24 scenarios, the overall at risk of poverty rate reduces with 0,2 to 0,4 percentage points (see 
Col1 of Table A2.1) while the poverty rate among children reduces with 0,4 to 0,8 percentage points 
(see Col2 of Table A2.1). In all cases the simulated reforms have, as expected, a greater impact on the at 
risk of poverty rate of the targeted group than on the rate of the whole population. 
The scenarios with the highest additional supplement for rank 1 and a status quo for the existing benefits 
(i.e. scenarios Sim4 to Sim6 and Sim16 to Sim18) appear to have the largest impact on the at risk of 
poverty rate (compare Col1 and Col2 of Table A2.1). Nonetheless the previous scenarios come, in terms 
of their potential to reduce the at risk of poverty rate, close to the ones with a mediated benefit for all 
scenarios (i.e. simulations Sim10 to Sim12 and Sim22 to Sim24). 
For the new targeted group, the direct impact on the at risk of poverty rate of increasing the income 
thresholds seems negligible. The maximal difference in the at risk of poverty rate for scenarios with the 
more elevated ceiling and the old ceiling is 0.1 percentage point (compare Sim1 to Sim12 with Sim13 to 
Sim24 in Table A2.1). 
Direct impact on children poverty rates for new categories affected by the reform: By household type 
and parents’ work intensity (Annexe 2, Tables A2.1 to A2.7) 
Since all the simulated reforms are targeted in the first place at couples with children, no effects are 
expected among single parents (as is confirmed in Col3 of Table A2.1 and Table A2.2). 
For couples the at risk of poverty rate changes over the different scenarios and over the household 
compositions. One might expect that couples with 3 or more children, who are on average poorer than 
couples with less children, would benefit more from the reforms. There is indeed a difference in the 
maximal percentage point reduction of the at risk of poverty rate over the different couple-types but as a 
percentage of the baseline value of the at risk of poverty rate this reduction is more or less constant (see 
Col3 to Col6 in Table A2.3). 
When looking further at the split out of the results over couples according to the work intensity one can 
see that, as expected, simulations of Type 1 and Type 3 do not have an impact on the at risk of poverty 
rate of jobless households (see Col1 of Table A2.4 and Table A2.5). For other work intensity types (i.e. 
couples with at least one part timer in the household) the reductions in the at risk of poverty rate in 
general come in packages of three. Hence, the reductions in the at risk of poverty rate for simulations of 
Type1, Type2 and Type3 seem to be more or less equal for couples of these work intensity types (see 
Col2 to Col5 of Table A2.4 and Table A2.5). Over the subsets of simulations there is some variation in 
the reduction nonetheless (see Col2 to Col5 of Table A2.4 and Table A2.5) because of the different 
benefits applied. 
We see that the potential influence on the at risk of poverty rate of the Type 1 to Type 3 simulations is 
constant for couples with at least one part time working individual. This must be that for those poor 
couples, who are at the edge of passing the poverty threshold, the non labour income sources are less 
important. The same couples pass at the same time the test for the additional benefit and the poverty line 
whether only their labour income is taken into account or when other income sources are taken into 
account as well. 
When looking at the number of children and households who gain from the different reforms (see 
Table A2.6 and Table A2.7) one can see that simulations of Type 2, not unexpectedly, always have the 
largest number of gainers. However, the difference with simulations of Type 3 is limited, which again 
confirms that other sources than labour income are less important to pass the income test to grant the 
new benefits. Not unexpectedly, simulations of Type 1 have the lowest number of gainers but the 
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difference in the number of affected individuals between Type 1 and Type 2 is more outspoken than the 
difference between Type 2 and Type 3. 
Hence, we see a) that for households with working individuals the reduction in the poverty rate is 
constant over the different simulation types and b) that the reduction of the at risk of poverty rate for 
jobless households in Type 2 simulations is limited.. Therefore one could conclude that simulations of 
Type 1 seem best targeted at those who are on the edge of passing the poverty line with the additional 
benefit (i.e. the same poverty rate reduction is reached with less affected people). Choosing for a Type 1 
scenario would come at the cost of not reaching jobless households but in the knowledge that for them 
the extra benefit granted in these scenarios is not the amount that would bring them above the poverty 
line. 
One can see from Table A2.6 and Table A2.7 that increasing the ceilings leads to a higher number of 
people affected (compare the number of gainers, Col3, in Sim1 to Sim12 with those in Sim13 to Sim24 
of both tables). Expressed as a percentage of the number of gainers with non adapted income ceilings, 
there are 18% to 29% more children that gain from increasing the income ceilings, which might be 
considered to be a considerable amount (use for this the figures in Col3 of Table A2.7 and express the 
difference between the figures in Sim1 to Sim12 with those in Sim13 to Sim24 as a percentage of the 
figures in Sim1 to Sim12). This results along with the earlier observations on the weak impact of the 
increase of ceilings on the at risk of poverty rate, can be translated as saying that measures with the 
current ceilings but with an additional supplement are better targeted at those who are on the edge of 
passing the poverty line (i.e. a similar reduction in the at risk of poverty rate is obtained with or without 
increased income ceilings but without increasing the ceilings less people are affected). 
Comparison of the impact on the at risk of poverty rates for all affected people with the direct impact of 
new beneficiaries (Annexes 2 and 3, Tables A2.1, A3.1 to A3.3) 
In general the pattern of the impact on the at risk of poverty rate when all effects are taken into account 
is similar to the one observed when we only consider the direct impact for gainers but the impact on the 
at risk of poverty rate is larger when all effects are considered (compare Table A2.1 and Table A3.1). 
Hence, in most cases the at risk of poverty rate reduces more by taking into account all effects, even in 
scenarios where there might be losers. Nonetheless in some rare occasions we find an increase in the at 
risk of poverty rate because of the reform, if all effects are considered (see e.g. Sim7 and Col1 of 
Table A3.3). 
Because of the more pronounced reductions in the at risk of poverty rate, the scenarios that also generate 
losers now look somewhat more advantageous in terms of their poverty reducing potential as compared 
to the scenarios with a high benefit for rank 1 children only (see e.g. Col2 in Table A2.1 and 
Table A3.1). 
One might also observe that taking into account the additional age supplement for simulations with only 
gainers, has a modest impact on the reduction of the at risk of poverty rate (compare Sim1 to Sim6 and 
Sim13 to Sim18 in Table A2.1 and Table A3.1). 
What can be remarked as well is that the impact on the at risk of poverty rate of increasing the income 
ceilings remains limited when all simulated effects of the reforms are taken into account (compare Sim1 
to Sim13 with Sim14 to Sim24 in Table A3.1). Hence, also for those who already receive a supplement, 
there is only a limited number of beneficiaries who are at the edge of passing the poverty line with the 
increased benefit. 
For singles there is an impact on the at risk of poverty rate now, but apparently not of increasing the 
income ceilings but because of the adaptation of their benefits (see Table A3.2). 
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6. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we simulate the redistributive impact of potential reforms in the family allowances 
schemes in Belgium. The aim of these hypothetical reforms is to adapt the amount of social family 
allowances and to extend their coverage to other groups at-risk of poverty. Up to now, only single-
parent families and specific categories of social security beneficiaries (i.e. unemployed, disabled and 
pensioners) were concerned. The simulated reforms extend these social family allowances supplements 
to other children, mainly those living in working poor households, on a means tested base.  
For this purpose, several (24) scenarios are simulated, varying either the population eligible for social 
family allowances supplements (three scenarios), or the earning mean test thresholds (two scenarios), or 
the amount of supplements by children rank (four scenarios). 
In order to analyse the redistributive impact of these potential reforms, we rely on the at-risk of poverty 
definition adopted by the European Union (Laeken Indicators) that identify as poor all the members of 
households with equivalised disposable income below the 60 % median threshold.  
The results show that, depending on scenarios, near all the children at-risk of poverty would benefit 
from these reforms, close to 75 % if eligibility takes into account explicitly labour income (Types 1 and 
3 scenarios) and close to 100 % if eligibility is extended to the whole population on the basis of an 
earnings mean test. Nevertheless, independently of the scenario analyzed, the main impact on poverty 
rates will be, as expected, among those children (less than 18 years old) living in jobless and working 
poor families. 
Further, the results presented illustrate that there is mixed evidence to evaluate the different scenarios 
that have been suggested: 
− All scenarios reduce the at risk of poverty rate of children more than the overall at risk of poverty 
rate. 
− The largest impact on the at risk of poverty rate is obtained in scenarios that might generate losers 
but their impact on the at risk of poverty rate is well approached by scenarios with a high benefit for 
children of rank 1. 
− For the new targeted group as well as for the whole group that might be affected by the reforms, 
increasing the income ceiling hardly has an effect on the at risk of poverty rate. 
− For the new targeted group the at risk of poverty rate also hardly differs over the different simulation 
types (i.e. testing on labour income only or overall gross income leads to marginal differences only). 
− The differences in impact for this subgroup mainly come from the differences in the attributed 
benefits. 
− If the focus of the reform would be to influence the at risk of poverty rate for the new target group 
only, then simulations of Type 1 seem best suited. They have almost everywhere a similar impact on 
the at risk of poverty rate as the other two types but they affect less individuals, so they are better 
targeted within this respect. 
− With simulations of Type 1, jobless households are not attained. If the objective is to influence the at 
risk of poverty rate, choosing for a Type 2 simulation would not have a large additional impact for 
couples without a job. Apparently they are too far of the poverty line to be lifted over it by the 
simulated reforms. 
− All scenarios increase the number of beneficiary children with a supplement and below the poverty 
line considerably but simulations of Type 2 have the largest impact according to this measure. 
Increasing the income ceilings does not seem to affect this measure a lot. 
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− Increasing the income ceilings leads to more individuals and households gaining from the reform. 
Since this observation goes hand in hand with the observation that the at risk of poverty rates are 
hardly affected by the increase in these ceilings and similar numbers of children below the poverty 
line that receive a supplement with or without an increased ceiling, one could say that the scenarios 
without an increased ceiling are better targeted at those at or below the at risk of poverty line. 
− A question that remains it whether one wants to go for a measure that is best targeted to reduce the 
at risk of poverty rate or a measure that reaches most beneficiary children below the poverty line. 
− If one wants to go for the first, it seems advisable to choose for simulations of Type 1 without an 
increase of the existing income ceiling and either with a considerable increase in the benefit for 
children of rank 1 (i.e. for Sim 4) or with a uniform supplement for all ranks (i.e. for Sim 10). 
− If one wants to go for the latter one should choose a simulation of Type 2 without an increase of the 
existing income ceiling and either with a considerable increase in the benefit for children of rank 1 
(i.e. for Sim 5) or with a uniform supplement for all ranks (i.e. for Sim 11). 
− The impact on the at risk of poverty rate of choosing for Sim 4 or 5 is estimated to be a bit more 
modest than in Sim 10 and Sim 11 but Sim 4 and Sim 5 have the advantage that they avoid that there 
are losers because of the reform. 
Certainly the results presented here are driven by the design of the reforms. An extended sensitivity 
analysis will be necessary to identify alternative reforms. And further analysis has to be done in order to 
identify the specific redistributive impact of reforms on couples whose one of the members is self-
employed. 
Another interesting issue for future research is the difficulty to identify accurately the beneficiaries of 
social family allowances. In the case of Belgium analyzed here, social family supplements eligibility is 
based upon a narrow definition of the household composition, while the analysis of poverty rates 
requires a broader concept which relies on the sociological household. Thus, if the income in the first 
concept is lower enough than that in the second one, a supplement can be granted to a family which is 
indeed not poor when all incomes of the household are taken into account. The reverse might also be 
possible.  
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APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF SIMULATED SCENARIOS 
Table A1.1: Summary of simulated reform scenarios 1 to 12 (no change in income ceiling for means test) 
Baseline Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 6 Sim 7 Sim 8 Sim 9 Sim 10 Sim 11 Sim 12
Monthly income ceiling
single parent 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91 2060,91
couples 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19 2131,19
Basic amount (monthly)
Social supplement (unemployed or pensioner)
rank 1 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - without sinlge parent supplement 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - with single parent supplement 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
Social supplement (disabled)
rank 1 91,35 91,35 91,35 91,35 91,35 91,35 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - without sinlge parent supplement 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - with single parent supplement 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
single parent supplement
rank 1 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
Extra supplement
Conditions:
social supplement no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl.
single parent supplement no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl.
labour income yes - low yes - low yes - low yes - low
household income low low - low low - low low - low low -
Monthly amount of the supplement
rank 1 42,46 42,46 42,46 91,35 91,35 91,35 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - without sinlge parent supplement 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - with single parent supplement 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
'-' means no test
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Table A1.2: Summary of simulated reform scenarios 13 to 14 (increase in income ceiling for means test) 
Baseline Sim 13 Sim 14 Sim 15 Sim 16 Sim 17 Sim 18 Sim 19 Sim 20 Sim 21 Sim 22 Sim 23 Sim 24
Monthly income ceiling
single parent 2060,91 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38 2077,38
couples 2131,19 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04 2362,04
Basic amount (monthly)
Social supplement (unemployed or pensioner)
rank 1 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - without sinlge parent supplement 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - with single parent supplement 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
Social supplement (disabled)
rank 1 91,35 91,35 91,35 91,35 91,35 91,35 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - without sinlge parent supplement 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - with single parent supplement 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
single parent supplement
rank 1 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 42,46 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
Extra supplement
Conditions:
social supplement no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl.
single parent supplement no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl. no suppl.
labour income yes - low yes - low yes - low yes - low
household income low low - low low - low low - low low -
Monthly amount of the supplement
rank 1 42,46 42,46 42,46 91,35 91,35 91,35 53,15 53,15 53,15 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 2 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 26,32 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - without sinlge parent supplement 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 4,62 38,87 38,87 38,87
rank 3 - with single parent supplement 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 21,22 38,87 38,87 38,87
'-' means no test
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APPENDIX 2: AT RISK OF POVERTY RATES, DIRECT IMPACT FOR NEW 
BENEFICIARIES EXCLUSSIVELY 
Table A2.1: At-risk of poverty rates by type of household 
Couple 








 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 
Baseline 15,2 15,2 30,8 10,5 9,5 16,5 10,6 
Sim1 15,0 14,8 30,8 10,1 9,0 16,0 10,4 
Sim2 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,1 9,0 15,8 10,4 
Sim3 15,0 14,8 30,8 10,1 9,0 16,0 10,4 
Sim4 14,9 14,5 30,8 9,8 8,7 15,7 10,3 
Sim5 14,8 14,4 30,8 9,7 8,7 15,5 10,3 
Sim6 14,9 14,5 30,8 9,8 8,7 15,7 10,2 
Sim7 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,0 9,0 15,9 10,3 
Sim8 14,9 14,6 30,8 10,0 8,9 15,7 10,3 
Sim9 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,0 9,0 15,9 10,3 
Sim10 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,1 9,0 15,7 10,5 
Sim11 14,9 14,5 30,8 10,1 8,9 15,3 10,5 
Sim12 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,1 8,9 15,7 10,4 
Sim13 15,0 14,8 30,8 10,1 9,0 16,0 10,4 
Sim14 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,0 9,0 15,8 10,4 
Sim15 15,0 14,8 30,8 10,1 9,0 16,0 10,4 
Sim16 14,9 14,5 30,8 9,8 8,7 15,7 10,2 
Sim17 14,8 14,4 30,8 9,6 8,6 15,4 10,2 
Sim18 14,9 14,5 30,8 9,8 8,7 15,7 10,2 
Sim19 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,0 8,9 15,9 10,3 
Sim20 14,9 14,6 30,8 9,9 8,9 15,7 10,3 
Sim21 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,0 8,9 15,9 10,3 
Sim22 14,9 14,7 30,8 10,1 8,9 15,7 10,4 
Sim23 14,9 14,5 30,8 10,0 8,9 15,2 10,4 
Sim24 14,9 14,7 30,8 10,1 8,9 15,7 10,4 
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Table A2.2: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Lone parent households  
Baseline and simulations Job-less Part time  Full Time All 
 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 
Baseline 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim1 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim2 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim3 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim4 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim5 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim6 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim7 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim8 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim9 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim10 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim11 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim12 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim13 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim14 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim15 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim16 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim17 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim18 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim19 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim20 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim21 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim22 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim23 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim24 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
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Table A2.3: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Couples with children 









 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 75,0 36,5 9,5 0,5 0,6 12,0 
Sim1 74,9 33,9 8,3 0,4 0,6 11,6 
Sim2 74,2 33,9 8,3 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim3 74,9 33,9 8,3 0,4 0,6 11,6 
Sim4 74,9 32,0 7,6 0,4 0,5 11,3 
Sim5 73,4 32,0 7,6 0,4 0,5 11,1 
Sim6 74,9 31,9 7,6 0,4 0,5 11,3 
Sim7 74,9 33,6 8,1 0,4 0,5 11,5 
Sim8 74,0 33,6 8,1 0,4 0,5 11,4 
Sim9 74,9 33,6 8,1 0,4 0,5 11,5 
Sim10 74,9 33,3 8,0 0,4 0,6 11,4 
Sim11 73,2 33,3 8,0 0,4 0,6 11,3 
Sim12 74,9 33,3 8,0 0,4 0,6 11,4 
Sim13 74,9 33,7 8,3 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim14 74,2 33,7 8,3 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim15 74,9 33,7 8,3 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim16 74,9 31,7 7,6 0,4 0,5 11,2 
Sim17 73,4 31,7 7,6 0,4 0,5 11,1 
Sim18 74,9 31,7 7,6 0,4 0,5 11,2 
Sim19 74,9 33,4 8,1 0,4 0,5 11,5 
Sim20 74,0 33,4 8,1 0,4 0,5 11,4 
Sim21 74,9 33,4 8,1 0,4 0,5 11,5 
Sim22 74,9 33,1 8,0 0,4 0,6 11,4 
Sim23 73,2 33,1 8,0 0,4 0,6 11,2 
Sim24 74,9 33,1 8,0 0,4 0,6 11,4 
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Table A2.4: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Couples with 1 or 2 children 









 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 73,9 35,0 10,2 0,4 0,6 9,9 
Sim1 73,9 32,9 8,9 0,3 0,6 9,4 
Sim2 73,5 32,9 8,9 0,3 0,6 9,4 
Sim3 73,9 32,9 8,9 0,3 0,6 9,4 
Sim4 73,9 30,4 8,2 0,3 0,4 9,1 
Sim5 72,7 30,4 8,2 0,3 0,4 9,0 
Sim6 73,9 30,4 8,2 0,3 0,4 9,1 
Sim7 73,9 32,5 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim8 73,3 32,5 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim9 73,9 32,5 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim10 73,9 32,6 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,4 
Sim11 73,3 32,6 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim12 73,9 32,6 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,4 
Sim13 73,9 32,5 8,9 0,3 0,6 9,4 
Sim14 73,5 32,5 8,9 0,3 0,6 9,3 
Sim15 73,9 32,5 8,9 0,3 0,6 9,4 
Sim16 73,9 30,1 8,2 0,3 0,4 9,1 
Sim17 72,7 30,1 8,2 0,3 0,4 9,0 
Sim18 73,9 30,1 8,2 0,3 0,4 9,1 
Sim19 73,9 32,2 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim20 73,3 32,2 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,2 
Sim21 73,9 32,2 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim22 73,9 32,3 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim23 73,3 32,3 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim24 73,9 32,3 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
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Table A2.5: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Couples with 3 or more children 









 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 76,1 38,9 8,3 0,7 0,8 16,5 
Sim1 76,0 35,7 7,3 0,7 0,7 16,0 
Sim2 74,9 35,7 7,3 0,7 0,7 15,8 
Sim3 76,0 35,7 7,3 0,7 0,7 16,0 
Sim4 76,0 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim5 74,2 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,5 
Sim6 76,0 34,2 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim7 76,0 35,5 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,9 
Sim8 74,8 35,5 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim9 76,0 35,5 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,9 
Sim10 75,9 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim11 73,1 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,3 
Sim12 75,9 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim13 76,0 35,7 7,3 0,7 0,7 16,0 
Sim14 74,9 35,7 7,3 0,7 0,7 15,8 
Sim15 76,0 35,7 7,3 0,7 0,7 16,0 
Sim16 76,0 34,2 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim17 74,2 34,2 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,4 
Sim18 76,0 34,2 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim19 76,0 35,5 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,9 
Sim20 74,8 35,5 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim21 76,0 35,5 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,9 
Sim22 75,9 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim23 73,1 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,2 
Sim24 75,9 34,5 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,7 
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Table A2.6: Number of affected households 
Baseline and 
simulations 
Total number of 
households Not affected Gainers Losers % Gainers % Losers 
 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 4.285.746 4.285.746 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Sim1 4.285.746 4.199.431 86.315 0 2.0 0.0 
Sim2 4.285.746 4.147.812 137.933 0 3.2 0.0 
Sim3 4.285.746 4.158.551 127.194 0 3.0 0.0 
Sim4 4.285.746 4.199.431 86.315 0 2.0 0.0 
Sim5 4.285.746 4.147.812 137.933 0 3.2 0.0 
Sim6 4.285.746 4.158.551 127.194 0 3.0 0.0 
Sim7 4.285.746 4.199.431 86.315 0 2.0 0.0 
Sim8 4.285.746 4.147.812 137.933 0 3.2 0.0 
Sim9 4.285.746 4.158.551 127.194 0 3.0 0.0 
Sim10 4.285.746 4.199.431 86.315 0 2.0 0.0 
Sim11 4.285.746 4.147.812 137.933 0 3.2 0.0 
Sim12 4.285.746 4.158.551 127.194 0 3.0 0.0 
Sim13 4.285.746 4.175.910 109.836 0 2.6 0.0 
Sim14 4.285.746 4.124.098 161.648 0 3.8 0.0 
Sim15 4.285.746 4.129.842 155.903 0 3.6 0.0 
Sim16 4.285.746 4.175.910 109.836 0 2.6 0.0 
Sim17 4.285.746 4.124.098 161.648 0 3.8 0.0 
Sim18 4.285.746 4.129.842 155.903 0 3.6 0.0 
Sim19 4.285.746 4.175.910 109.836 0 2.6 0.0 
Sim20 4.285.746 4.124.098 161.648 0 3.8 0.0 
Sim21 4.285.746 4.129.842 155.903 0 3.6 0.0 
Sim22 4.285.746 4.175.910 109.836 0 2.6 0.0 
Sim23 4.285.746 4.124.098 161.648 0 3.8 0.0 
Sim24 4.285.746 4.129.842 155.903 0 3.6 0.0 
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Table A2.7: Number of affected children 
Baseline and 
simulations 
Total number of 
children Not affected Gainers Losers % Gainers % Losers 
 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 2.122.553 2.122.553 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Sim1 2.122.553 1.983.538 139.015 0 6.5 0.0 
Sim2 2.122.553 1.898.810 223.743 0 10.5 0.0 
Sim3 2.122.553 1.920.747 201.806 0 9.5 0.0 
Sim4 2.122.553 1.983.538 139.015 0 6.5 0.0 
Sim5 2.122.553 1.898.810 223.743 0 10.5 0.0 
Sim6 2.122.553 1.920.747 201.806 0 9.5 0.0 
Sim7 2.122.553 1.983.538 139.015 0 6.5 0.0 
Sim8 2.122.553 1.898.810 223.743 0 10.5 0.0 
Sim9 2.122.553 1.920.747 201.806 0 9.5 0.0 
Sim10 2.122.553 1.983.538 139.015 0 6.5 0.0 
Sim11 2.122.553 1.898.810 223.743 0 10.5 0.0 
Sim12 2.122.553 1.920.747 201.806 0 9.5 0.0 
Sim13 2.122.553 1.943.519 179.034 0 8.4 0.0 
Sim14 2.122.553 1.858.582 263.971 0 12.4 0.0 
Sim15 2.122.553 1.873.392 249.161 0 11.7 0.0 
Sim16 2.122.553 1.943.519 179.034 0 8.4 0.0 
Sim17 2.122.553 1.858.582 263.971 0 12.4 0.0 
Sim18 2.122.553 1.873.392 249.161 0 11.7 0.0 
Sim19 2.122.553 1.943.519 179.034 0 8.4 0.0 
Sim20 2.122.553 1.858.582 263.971 0 12.4 0.0 
Sim21 2.122.553 1.873.392 249.161 0 11.7 0.0 
Sim22 2.122.553 1.943.519 179.034 0 8.4 0.0 
Sim23 2.122.553 1.858.582 263.971 0 12.4 0.0 
Sim24 2.122.553 1.873.392 249.161 0 11.7 0.0 
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APPENDIX 3: AT RISK OF POVERTY RATES, ALL AFFECTED BENEFITS 
Table A3.1: At-risk of poverty rates by type of household 
Couple 








 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 Col7 
Baseline 15,2 15,2 30,8 10,5 9,5 16,5 10,6 
Sim1 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,1 9,0 15,9 10,4 
Sim2 14,9 14,6 30,8 10,0 8,9 15,7 10,4 
Sim3 15,0 14,7 30,8 10,1 9,0 15,9 10,4 
Sim4 14,8 14,5 30,8 9,8 8,6 15,6 10,3 
Sim5 14,7 14,3 30,8 9,5 8,5 15,3 10,3 
Sim6 14,8 14,5 30,8 9,7 8,6 15,6 10,2 
Sim7 14,8 14,4 29,3 10,0 9,0 15,8 10,2 
Sim8 14,8 14,4 29,3 9,9 8,9 15,6 10,2 
Sim9 14,8 14,4 29,3 10,0 8,9 15,8 10,2 
Sim10 14,8 14,2 29,3 10,1 8,9 14,9 10,5 
Sim11 14,7 14,1 29,3 10,0 8,9 14,4 10,5 
Sim12 14,8 14,2 29,3 10,1 8,9 14,9 10,4 
Sim13 14,9 14,7 30,8 10,0 8,9 15,9 10,3 
Sim14 14,9 14,6 30,8 9,9 8,9 15,7 10,3 
Sim15 14,9 14,7 30,8 10,0 8,9 15,8 10,3 
Sim16 14,8 14,4 30,8 9,7 8,6 15,6 10,0 
Sim17 14,7 14,3 30,8 9,5 8,5 15,2 10,0 
Sim18 14,8 14,4 30,8 9,7 8,6 15,6 10,0 
Sim19 14,8 14,4 29,3 10,0 8,9 15,8 10,1 
Sim20 14,8 14,3 29,3 9,9 8,9 15,6 10,1 
Sim21 14,8 14,4 29,3 10,0 8,9 15,8 10,1 
Sim22 14,8 14,2 29,3 10,1 8,9 14,9 10,2 
Sim23 14,7 14,0 29,3 10,0 8,8 14,4 10,2 
Sim24 14,8 14,2 29,3 10,1 8,9 14,8 10,2 
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Table A3.2: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Lone parent households  




 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 
Baseline 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim1 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim2 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim3 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim4 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim5 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim6 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim7 45,9 27,4 4,6 29,3 
Sim8 45,9 27,4 4,6 29,3 
Sim9 45,9 27,4 4,6 29,3 
Sim10 45,7 27,7 4,7 29,3 
Sim11 45,7 27,7 4,7 29,3 
Sim12 45,7 27,7 4,7 29,3 
Sim13 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim14 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim15 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim16 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim17 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim18 48,3 28,5 4,8 30,8 
Sim19 45,9 27,4 4,6 29,3 
Sim20 45,9 27,4 4,6 29,3 
Sim21 45,9 27,4 4,6 29,3 
Sim22 45,7 27,7 4,7 29,3 
Sim23 45,7 27,7 4,7 29,3 
Sim24 45,7 27,7 4,7 29,3 
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Table A3.3: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Couples with children 









 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 75,0 36,5 9,5 0,5 0,6 12,0 
Sim1 74,9 33,5 8,1 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim2 74,0 33,5 8,1 0,4 0,6 11,4 
Sim3 74,9 33,5 8,1 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim4 74,9 31,3 7,5 0,4 0,5 11,2 
Sim5 72,9 31,3 7,5 0,4 0,5 11,0 
Sim6 74,9 31,2 7,5 0,4 0,5 11,2 
Sim7 75,2 33,2 7,9 0,4 0,5 11,4 
Sim8 74,2 33,2 7,9 0,4 0,5 11,3 
Sim9 75,2 33,2 7,9 0,4 0,5 11,4 
Sim10 73,1 32,6 7,8 0,4 0,6 11,2 
Sim11 71,2 32,6 7,8 0,4 0,6 11,0 
Sim12 73,1 32,6 7,8 0,4 0,6 11,1 
Sim13 74,9 33,3 8,1 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim14 74,0 33,3 8,1 0,4 0,6 11,4 
Sim15 74,9 33,3 8,1 0,4 0,6 11,5 
Sim16 74,9 31,0 7,5 0,4 0,5 11,2 
Sim17 72,9 31,0 7,5 0,4 0,5 10,9 
Sim18 74,9 31,0 7,4 0,4 0,5 11,1 
Sim19 75,2 33,0 7,9 0,4 0,5 11,4 
Sim20 74,2 33,0 7,9 0,4 0,5 11,3 
Sim21 75,2 33,0 7,9 0,4 0,5 11,4 
Sim22 73,1 32,4 7,8 0,4 0,6 11,1 
Sim23 71,2 32,4 7,8 0,4 0,6 10,9 
Sim24 73,1 32,4 7,7 0,4 0,6 11,1 
 
  34. 
Table A3.4: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Couples with 1 or 2 children 









 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 73,9 35,0 10,2 0,4 0,6 9,9 
Sim1 73,9 32,4 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim2 73,3 32,4 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim3 73,9 32,4 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim4 73,9 29,9 8,0 0,3 0,4 9,0 
Sim5 72,1 29,9 8,0 0,3 0,4 8,9 
Sim6 73,9 29,9 8,0 0,3 0,4 9,0 
Sim7 74,4 32,3 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim8 73,7 32,3 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim9 74,4 32,3 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim10 74,3 32,5 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim11 73,6 32,5 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim12 74,3 32,5 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim13 73,9 32,1 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim14 73,3 32,1 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim15 73,9 32,1 8,8 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim16 73,9 29,5 8,0 0,3 0,4 9,0 
Sim17 72,1 29,5 8,0 0,3 0,4 8,8 
Sim18 73,9 29,5 8,0 0,3 0,4 9,0 
Sim19 74,4 32,0 8,5 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim20 73,7 32,0 8,5 0,3 0,5 9,2 
Sim21 74,4 32,0 8,5 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim22 74,3 32,2 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
Sim23 73,6 32,2 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,2 
Sim24 74,3 32,2 8,6 0,3 0,5 9,3 
 
  35. 
Table A3.5: Children at-risk of poverty rates (%) 
Couples with 3 or more children 









 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 76,1 38,9 8,3 0,7 0,8 16,5 
Sim1 76,0 35,2 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,9 
Sim2 74,7 35,2 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim3 76,0 35,2 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,9 
Sim4 75,9 33,6 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,6 
Sim5 73,6 33,6 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,3 
Sim6 75,9 33,4 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,6 
Sim7 76,0 34,8 6,9 0,7 0,7 15,8 
Sim8 74,7 34,8 6,9 0,7 0,7 15,6 
Sim9 76,0 34,8 6,9 0,7 0,7 15,8 
Sim10 71,8 32,7 6,6 0,7 0,7 14,9 
Sim11 68,7 32,7 6,6 0,7 0,7 14,4 
Sim12 71,8 32,7 6,5 0,7 0,7 14,9 
Sim13 76,0 35,2 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,9 
Sim14 74,7 35,2 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,7 
Sim15 76,0 35,2 7,1 0,7 0,7 15,8 
Sim16 75,9 33,4 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,6 
Sim17 73,6 33,4 6,7 0,7 0,7 15,2 
Sim18 75,9 33,4 6,6 0,7 0,7 15,6 
Sim19 76,0 34,8 6,9 0,7 0,7 15,8 
Sim20 74,7 34,8 6,9 0,7 0,7 15,6 
Sim21 76,0 34,8 6,9 0,7 0,7 15,8 
Sim22 71,8 32,7 6,5 0,7 0,7 14,9 
Sim23 68,7 32,7 6,5 0,7 0,7 14,4 
Sim24 71,8 32,7 6,5 0,7 0,7 14,8 
 
  36. 
Table A3.6: Number of affected households 
Baseline and 
simulations 
Total number of 
households Not affected Gainers Losers % Gainers % Losers 
 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 4.285.746 4.285.746 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Sim1 4.285.746 4.199.431 86.315 0 2.0 0.0 
Sim2 4.285.746 4.147.812 137.933 0 3.2 0.0 
Sim3 4.285.746 4.158.551 127.194 0 3.0 0.0 
Sim4 4.285.746 4.199.431 86.315 0 2.0 0.0 
Sim5 4.285.746 4.147.812 137.933 0 3.2 0.0 
Sim6 4.285.746 4.158.551 127.194 0 3.0 0.0 
Sim7 4.285.746 3.965.850 293.701 26.194 6.9 0.6 
Sim8 4.285.746 3.914.299 345.252 26.194 8.1 0.6 
Sim9 4.285.746 3.925.007 334.545 26.194 7.8 0.6 
Sim10 4.285.746 3.963.435 188.196 134.114 4.4 3.1 
Sim11 4.285.746 3.912.451 239.248 134.046 5.6 3.1 
Sim12 4.285.746 3.922.773 228.858 134.114 5.3 3.1 
Sim13 4.285.746 4.170.547 115.198 0 2.7 0.0 
Sim14 4.285.746 4.118.735 167.011 0 3.9 0.0 
Sim15 4.285.746 4.124.480 161.266 0 3.8 0.0 
Sim16 4.285.746 4.170.547 115.198 0 2.7 0.0 
Sim17 4.285.746 4.118.735 167.011 0 3.9 0.0 
Sim18 4.285.746 4.124.480 161.266 0 3.8 0.0 
Sim19 4.285.746 3.936.981 322.570 26.194 7.5 0.6 
Sim20 4.285.746 3.885.237 374.315 26.194 8.7 0.6 
Sim21 4.285.746 3.890.967 368.584 26.194 8.6 0.6 
Sim22 4.285.746 3.934.723 216.924 134.099 5.1 3.1 
Sim23 4.285.746 3.883.544 268.170 134.032 6.3 3.1 
Sim24 4.285.746 3.888.902 262.762 134.082 6.1 3.1 
  37. 
Table A3.7: Number of affected children 
Baseline and 
simulations 
Total number of 
children Not affected Gainers Losers % Gainers % Losers 
 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 2.122.553 2.122.553 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Sim1 2.122.553 1.983.538 139.015 0 6.5 0.0 
Sim2 2.122.553 1.898.810 223.743 0 10.5 0.0 
Sim3 2.122.553 1.920.747 201.806 0 9.5 0.0 
Sim4 2.122.553 1.983.538 139.015 0 6.5 0.0 
Sim5 2.122.553 1.898.810 223.743 0 10.5 0.0 
Sim6 2.122.553 1.920.747 201.806 0 9.5 0.0 
Sim7 2.122.553 1.647.899 438.512 36.141 20.7 1.7 
Sim8 2.122.553 1.563.370 523.042 36.141 24.6 1.7 
Sim9 2.122.553 1.585.254 501.157 36.141 23.6 1.7 
Sim10 2.122.553 1.642.169 371.294 109.090 17.5 5.1 
Sim11 2.122.553 1.559.311 454.350 108.892 21.4 5.1 
Sim12 2.122.553 1.579.839 433.624 109.090 20.4 5.1 
Sim13 2.122.553 1.936.011 186.542 0 8.8 0.0 
Sim14 2.122.553 1.851.073 271.480 0 12.8 0.0 
Sim15 2.122.553 1.865.883 256.670 0 12.1 0.0 
Sim16 2.122.553 1.936.011 186.542 0 8.8 0.0 
Sim17 2.122.553 1.851.073 271.480 0 12.8 0.0 
Sim18 2.122.553 1.865.883 256.670 0 12.1 0.0 
Sim19 2.122.553 1.600.417 485.995 36.141 22.9 1.7 
Sim20 2.122.553 1.515.677 570.734 36.141 26.9 1.7 
Sim21 2.122.553 1.530.452 555.959 36.141 26.2 1.7 
Sim22 2.122.553 1.595.010 418.497 109.046 19.7 5.1 
Sim23 2.122.553 1.511.941 501.764 108.848 23.6 5.1 
Sim24 2.122.553 1.525.453 488.071 109.028 23.0 5.1 
 
  38. 
APPENDIX 4: SOCIAL FAMILY ALLOWANCES SUPPLEMENTS AND POSITION WITH 
RESPECT TO THE POVERTY LINE 
Table A4.1: Percentage of children with supplement, below or above the poverty line (in %) 
Children below the poverty line Children at or above the poverty line 
Baseline and 










 Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6 
Baseline 15.2 53.3 46.7 84.8 9.2 90.8 
Sim1 14.8 73.0 27.0 85.2 13.6 86.4 
Sim2 14.7 96.6 3.4 85.3 14.2 85.8 
Sim3 14.8 73.0 27.0 85.2 17.0 83.0 
Sim4 14.6 72.6 27.4 85.4 13.8 86.2 
Sim5 14.4 96.5 3.5 85.5 14.4 85.6 
Sim6 14.6 72.6 27.4 85.4 17.2 82.8 
Sim7 14.7 72.8 27.2 85.2 13.6 86.4 
Sim8 14.7 96.6 3.4 85.3 14.2 85.8 
Sim9 14.8 73.0 27.0 85.2 17.0 83.0 
Sim10 14.7 72.8 27.2 85.3 13.7 86.3 
Sim11 14.6 96.6 3.4 85.4 14.3 85.7 
Sim12 14.7 72.8 27.2 85.3 17.1 82.9 
Sim13 14.7 73.5 26.5 85.2 15.7 84.3 
Sim14 14.7 97.3 2.7 85.3 16.3 83.7 
Sim15 14.7 73.5 26.5 85.3 19.6 80.4 
Sim16 14.5 73.1 26.9 85.5 16.0 84.0 
Sim17 14.4 97.2 2.8 85.6 16.6 83.4 
Sim18 14.5 73.1 26.9 85.5 19.8 80.2 
Sim19 14.7 73.5 26.5 85.3 15.8 84.2 
Sim20 14.6 97.3 2.7 85.4 16.4 83.6 
Sim21 14.7 73.5 26.5 85.3 19.6 80.4 
Sim22 14.6 73.3 26.7 85.3 15.8 84.2 
Sim23 14.5 97.2 2.8 85.5 16.5 83.5 
Sim24 14.6 73.3 26.7 85.4 19.7 80.3 
Note: Computed taking into account all beneficiaries of social family allowances, including orphans and guaranteed family 
allowances.  
